v UNCTAD -ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development FOREWORD Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have never been more economically and politically important or controversial than they are today. They are frequently mentioned in discussions and debates on diverse topics such as public health, food security, education, trade, industrial policy, traditional knowledge, biodiversity, biotechnology, the Internet, and the entertainment and media industries. In a knowledge-based economy, there is no doubt that a better understanding of IPRs is indispensable to informed policy making in all areas of human development.
Empirical evidence on the role of intellectual property protection in promoting innovation and growth in general remains limited and inconclusive. Conflicting views also persist on the impact of IPRs on development prospects. Some argue that in a modern economy, the standards laid down in the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) will bring benefits to developing countries by creating the incentive structure necessary for knowledge generation and diffusion, thus inducing innovation, technology transfer and private investment flows. Others counter that intellectual property, especially some of its elements, such as the patent regime, will adversely affect the pursuit of sustainable development strategies for instance by raising the prices of essential drugs to levels that are too high for the poor to afford; limiting the availability of educational materials for developing country school and university students; legitimising the piracy of traditional knowledge; and undermining the self-reliance of resource-poor farmers. While TRIPS has established substantive minimum standards of protection and enforcement of IPRs, recent regional and bilateral free trade agreements (hereinafter "FTAs") include IPR commitments that go beyond these TRIPS standards. The FTAs require significant changes in the domestic legislation of participating countries.
It is urgent, therefore, to ask the questions: how best can the developing countries use intellectual property tools to advance their development strategy? What are the key concerns surrounding the issues of IPRs for developing countries? What are the specific difficulties they face in intellectual property negotiations? Is intellectual property directly relevant to sustainable development and to the achievement of agreed international development goals? Do developing countries have the capacity, especially the leastdeveloped among them, to formulate their negotiating positions and become well-informed negotiating partners? These are essential questions that policy-makers need to address in order to design intellectual property laws and policies that best meet the needs of their people, as well as to negotiate their positions effectively in the future.
It is to address some of these questions that the UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development was launched in July 2001. One central objective has been to facilitate the emergence of a critical mass of well-informed stakeholders in developing countries -including decision makers, negotiators but also the private sector and civil society -who will be able to define their own sustainable human development objectives in the field of intellectual property and effectively advance them at the national and international levels.
The present paper on Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S. Federal Law is a part of the efforts of the UNCTAD/ICTSD
Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development to contribute to a better understanding of issues relating to the implementation of intellectual property provisions arising from FTAs and their impact on both developed and developing countries.
There is a relatively consistent view among economists studying intellectual property rights that the interests of countries with respect to standards of protection varies depending upon the level of development and other characteristics of the country adopting such protection. The TRIPS Agreement provides some flexibility to WTO Members with respect to the level of protection, allowing developing countries a measure of leeway. Since there has been little enthusiasm at the WTO for raising standards of IPRs protection above that mandated by TRIPS, the United States has shifted its attention to other fora to accomplish its objective of securing greater levels of IPRs-based rents or royalties. The U.S. FTA policy weakly takes into account developmental interests. In some areas, such as the protection of pharmaceutical patent holders, U.S. policy threatens to cause harm to the interests of comparatively poor populations.
IPRs and related regulatory standards deemed appropriate for the United States may not be appropriate for developing countries. Even so, within the United States the law establishes a particular balance between the interests of IPRs holders and consumers. Most U.S. IPRs rules are formulated in terms of general principles, with limitations and exceptions to them. The FTAs negotiated by the United States largely reflect the general rules of application, though not in all cases. What the FTAs do not adequately reflect is the interplay between rule, limitation and exception that establishes the balance. This is of special importance in areas such as public health regulation where incomplete familiarity with the flexibility inherent in the U.S. system may lead its trading partners to conclude that restrictive implementation of the FTAs is required. Differences in the capacity of the United States and many developing countries to create and manage legal infrastructure may lead to a disparity in the way FTA rules are implemented.
In the negotiating process, developing countries should carefully consider whether the capacity of their domestic legal and regulatory system will permit them to balance interests as does the United States. It is probably unwise to accept commitments that will strain domestic capacity and which may lead to the application of rules in a more restrictive manner than the agreements require. If commitments are accepted, developing countries should pay careful attention to implementing them in a way which properly reflects the domestic public interest.
In conclusion, this study suggests that it is not only the public in developing countries that encounters risk from these FTAs. The U.S. public faces similar risks. The USTR assures the United States Congress that the agreements do not tie the hands of the domestic legislator. This is a position perhaps comfortably asserted within the more powerful of the parties to an FTA. Yet it is almost inevitable that when Congress considers changing domestic law, arguments will be made by industry groups that to do so may violate America's international obligations and damage the national interest. Congress may choose to ignore U.S. international obligations, but it would be surprising if Congress were not at least somewhat reluctant to do so. The United States is increasingly bound by a set of highly restrictive intellectual property and regulatory commitments that may not over time be seen to be consistent with the American public interest. INTRODUCTION During the past several years the United States has concluded a substantial number of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (hereinafter "FTAs"), largely with developing countries.
1 Each of those FTAs includes substantial commitments in the field of intellectual property rights and related regulatory matters. The United States is exporting high levels of intellectual property rights protection. These levels of protection exceed those required by the TRIPS Agreement which establishes minimum substantive standards of protection and enforcement for all WTO Members.
There is a relatively consistent view among economists studying intellectual property rights that the interests of countries with respect to standards of protection varies depending upon the level of development and other characteristics of the country adopting such protection. 2 The TRIPS Agreement provides some flexibility to WTO Members with respect to the level of protection, allowing developing countries a measure of leeway. 3 Because there has been little enthusiasm at the WTO for raising standards of IPRs protection above that mandated by TRIPS, the United States has shifted its attention to other fora to accomplish its objective of securing greater levels of IPRsbased rents or royalties. U.S. FTA policy only weakly takes into account developmental interests. In some areas, such as the protection of pharmaceutical patent holders, U.S. policy threatens to cause harm to the interests of comparatively poor populations. 4 The intellectual property rights chapters of the FTAs set forth obligations to provide protection for various subject matter, including expressive works (protected by copyright), trademarks, geographical indications, inventions (protected by patents) and data (protected by marketing exclusivity rules). These obligations are in most, but not all, cases consistent with the general level of IPRs protection required by U.S. federal law, 5 which law is more favorable to right holders than the TRIPS Agreement. In a number of cases, the exceptions in the FTAs are narrower than those allowed by the TRIPS Agreement. The problems potentially created for developing countries by the adoption of these IPRs provisions in fields such as public health have been widely noted. 6 Differences in the capacity of the United States and many developing countries to create and manage legal infrastructure may lead to a disparity in the way FTA rules are implemented. The United States already has in place a sophisticated system of checks and balances to offset the general intellectual property and regulatory standards which are reflected in the FTAs. Historically, the internal law of the United States has reflected a careful balance between the interests of intellectual property rights holders and the general public.
7 While over the past two decades the balance may have shifted in favor of IPRs holders, nonetheless, U.S. law continues to reflect a balance. Some of that balance is constitutionally mandated.
8 Some is codified in legislation and regulation, and some arises out of court interpretation.
Developing countries may not have such checks and balances in place and may be limited in the technical capacity to implement such checks and balances effectively. 9 Unless developing countries are effectively enabled to legislate appropriate checks and balances, they may find themselves with substantially stricter intellectual property and related regulatory systems than the United States. The critical lesson for developing countries accepting IPRs commitments in FTAs with the United States is that U.S. IPRs law is replete with exceptions to the general rules, in many cases elaborated in considerable detail. If developing countries accept obligations in the FTAs, they must also be prepared to implement a significant level of exceptions so as to create a reasonable balance within their own law. If they do not implement these exceptions, they will find themselves not only with TRIPS-plus levels of IPRs protection, but also with U.S.-plus levels of IPRs protection.
This key lesson presents a substantial dilemma for developing countries. The IPRs and related regulatory system in place in the United States is complex, difficult to develop and implement, and costly to maintain. Many developing countries have yet to implement basic TRIPS standards in a way that the United States considers adequate. It is difficult to understand the purpose of imposing even more rigorous and complex undertakings on developing countries in these circumstances. It appears that developing countries which enter into these FTA commitments may immediately be in default of their obligations, and remain so. As such, they will be vulnerable to trade-related claims by the United States and its industry groups. FTAs In the U.S. constitutional system, the President (i.e., the executive) is responsible for negotiating international agreements. 10 However, Congress has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations (i.e., trade) and must approve trade agreements prior to ratification by the President.
11 It typically does so under a socalled "fast-track" procedure pursuant to which Congress has agreed to forgo conditioning its approval of the agreements on amendment to the negotiated and signed texts (i.e., it agrees to vote "yes" or "no" on the signed and submitted text), in exchange for commitment by the President to consult with Congress during the negotiation process.
12 As a practical matter, the commitment by Congress to vote a trade agreement up or down without demanding amendment is, at least in substantial part, illusory. Members of Congress regularly demand new concessions from countries that have negotiated trade agreements with the United States during the approval process, and the President (through USTR) makes post-signature demands which are typically incorporated in side letters or understandings.
13
Extensions by Congress of trade negotiating authority to the President include express statements of objectives.
14 These statements include negotiating objectives with respect to intellectual property rights. Developing countries must recognize that directly effective international agreements allow private operators to challenge pre-existing legislation that is inconsistent with them. If a government wants to control the terms of implementation of the agreement, it must be prepared to adopt implementing changes to domestic law that are consistent with the agreement. Also, for developing countries, allowing direct effect presents risks because large multinational companies often have substantially greater access to legal resources than even the national government. Governments may find themselves faced with court challenges based on international agreements which are given direct or selfexecuting effect. 24 Even though governments may also be challenged on the basis of ordinary domestic legislation, the terms of domestic law typically will not have been negotiated with a foreign government.
USTR has expressly advised Congress that it may adopt subsequent legislation inconsistent with the terms of an FTA. 25 27 This is referred to as the "last in time" rule; meaning that the later-adopted of a statute or international agreement will govern. Also, the terms of the FTAs do not strictly obligate the parties to implement the decisions of dispute settlement panels. They may instead elect to offer compensation. 28 In any case, most countries will not give direct effect to the decisions of dispute settlement panels of FTAs (or, for that matter, of the WTO (including the Appellate Body)). In order to give domestic effect to a dispute settlement decision, government implementing action is required.
The legislatures of U.S. FTA partners whose constitutions allow subsequent domestic legislation to conflict with the terms of an international agreement (i.e., those which do not follow a so-called "monist" approach), may also legislate inconsistently with the terms of the FTA. 29 In doing so, they may breach an international obligation to the United States. Because of the large imbalance in effective political and economic power between the United States and its FTA partners, countries other than the United States may find the breach of such obligations problematic. The economy of the United States is significantly dependent on only a few foreign countries, meaning that the United States can afford to strain its political and economic relations with almost all other countries. For many smaller and developing country economies, denial of access to the U.S. market would create very serious adverse effects. Therefore, it is likely that the legislatures of most U.S. FTA partners will be significantly more reluctant to legislate inconsistently with an FTA than the U.S. Congress.
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
( The U.S. Patent Act (at 35 USC §156) provides for extension of the patent term with respect to drugs that undergo regulatory approval at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This provision is complex and subject to a substantial number of conditions and qualifications.
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The regulatory review is divided into two phases: (1) the phase during which the drug is subject to clinical testing (which is dated from authorization to test by the FDA) (the "testing" phase) and (2) the phase during which the FDA evaluates the test (and other) data (the "approval" phase). One half of the period of the testing phase plus the approval phase are subject to compensation (35 USC §156 (c) & (g)).
In no event may the duration of the extension exceed five years (35 USC §156(g)(6)(A)). The total period of effective patent protection may not exceed 14 years (the original patent term, shortened by the regulatory review period, plus the extension) (35 USC §156(c)(3)). There are a substantial number of additional conditions, including a limitation to the first commercial marketing of the product.
The provision of the FTA is not qualified by reference to "one half" of the testing phase of the regulatory review period, nor is a five-year limitation (or total 14 year period) implied or even suggested. A legislator outside the United Each of the IPRs chapters of the FTAs differs. These differences arise from a number of factors. The United States was insistent that Australia and Singapore, as high income countries, accept greater restrictions on compulsory licensing than other FTA partners. Chile was more successful in maintaining flexibilities than were the CAFTA countries. 30 This may have been due to more powerful local interest groups within Chile, such as local pharmaceutical manufacturers, which placed pressure on government negotiators. Also, the objectives of the United States have become more ambitious over time. The more recent agreements with Central America-DR, Bahrain and Morocco are highly restrictive.
Nonetheless, the IPRs chapters of the FTAs are more notable for their similarities than their differences. In this paper, illustrative provisions are used from the various FTAs without in each case comparing the cited provisions to others that were negotiated (and may be different). However, there are several sources that compare the IPRs provisions in each of the FTAs and which may be consulted. 
Patents

Patent term extension
The FTAs generally require an extension of the patent term for pharmaceutical products (or other products) to "compensate" for unreasonable curtailment of the patent term based on regulatory review procedures. For example, the U.S. -Bahrain FTA provides: States who is unfamiliar with the U.S. statutory scheme would not likely assume that the FTA provision is based on a provision of U.S. law which is so highly qualified.
33 That legislator might logically assume that compensation is intended to take place strictly reflecting the period of regulatory review.
Another common provision of the FTAs requires an extension of the patent term for unreasonable delay in the granting of a patent, and fixes a maximum term from the date of filing or request for examination to trigger the extension. For example, the U.S. The U.S. Patent Act provides (at 35 USC §154) for extension of the patent term based on delay of the Patent Office, generally more than three years from the filing of the application. Unlike the extension based on drug regulatory approval, the extension based on delay of the Patent Office applies to all fields of technology. However, there are several important exceptions to the general rule of extension. 34 Thus, for example, if an interference is declared under 35 USC 135(a) and a proceeding is held to determine the rightful claimant to a patent among competing claimants, the interference period is excluded from the processing time (as are appeals from decisions of the patent examiner). Likewise delays based on national security review are excluded.
The FTA provision does not refer to the exceptions adopted in the United States. And, because the FTA provision expressly excludes delays based on actions of the patent applicant, an inference might logically be drawn that any delays based on events other than those of the patent applicant may not be excluded. Yet, the U.S. Patent Act incorporates additional exclusions.
Provisions which extend the term of patents are especially important to developing countries in fields such as pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals where each additional year of protection may have a significant effect on the national health care and agriculture budget.
Regulatory review exception
The FTAs commonly restate Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement and separately incorporate a specific provision with respect to the regulatory review exception. The regulatory review exception in the U.S. While not all U.S. FTA partners have significant research and development capacity, for those that do, recognizing the broad scope of the exception granted for pharmaceutical R&D in the United States is very important because it means that a similar exception should be recognized within their own jurisdiction. Moreover, the aggressive U.S. Supreme Court approach to exceptions should signal other countries that the language of the FTAs can be interpreted in a way that allows considerable flexibility in how the domestic medicines regulatory approval system can be operated.
Patent-regulatory approval linkage
In most countries, in order for a drug to be placed on the market it must be approved and registered by local public health regulatory authorities. When a "new" drug application is first submitted by its "originator" in a country with the capacity to undertake a sophisticated evaluation, 37 the application will include information concerning clinical trials designed to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the drug. There are at least two situations in which less comprehensive information is presented in drug approval applications. First, countries with less sophisticated capacity for the evaluation of drug applications may rely on the fact of approval in another country as the basis for determining the safety and efficacy of the originator's product. So, for example, after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has approved a new drug, public health authorities in developing countries may decide to accept the FDA's approval as the basis for their own approval. Second, when generic producers are preparing to enter the market with the same drug as the initially approved originator drug, typically they are required only to demonstrate the "bioequivalence" of their product with the originator's product. The originator will have already demonstrated that the drug is safe and effective. For the public health authorities it is only a matter of ascertaining that the generic producer intends to provide the same thing. Requiring the generic producer to repeat clinical tests of safety and efficacy would be a waste of time and money, and it would be unethical. A portion of the patients in a clinical study typically receive a placebo and do not benefit during the course of the study.
The originator of a new drug often also holds a patent on the drug. However, many countries permit parties other than the patent holder/ originator to register a drug during the term of the patent so that these other parties are prepared to promptly place the drug on the market when the patent expires.
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Some countries, such as the United States, have established legislative and regulatory linkages between the patent system and the public health regulatory system. Designing a system which prevents the effective marketing approval of a medicine during the term of a patent without significantly impairing the ability of generic producers to place drugs on the market at the end of the patent term has proven exceedingly difficult. One of the principal reasons is that patents on drugs are not difficult to secure. Even in the United States and European Union, where patent offices employ significant numbers of highly trained technical staff, patents that are subject to challenge are often found to be invalid. 39 They should not have been granted. However, the staff at the public health regulatory office responsible for marketing approval of medicines typically will not be in a position to evaluate whether a patent is valid. The health regulatory staff must in effect rely on the determination made by the patent office. Both "good patents" and "bad patents" become obstacles to the marketing approval of generic drugs. This problem can be particularly acute in countries where there is no effective examination of patent applications.
Allowing the patent holder to block the effective marketing approval of a drug enhances its capacity to prevent third-party sales by setting an additional obstacle in the path of those sales. Recognizing that patents may not have been granted on solid grounds, the United States employs a complex linkage mechanism by which patent holders may prevent the early market entry of generic drugs. Pharmaceutical patent holders list their patents on the "Orange Book" of the FDA. 40 When a generic producer submits an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to the FDA it must certify whether there is a patent covering the drug 41 and whether it is seeking to market the drug before the expiration of the patent term. The generic producer may indicate that it does not consider a patent to be valid and that it intends to market the drug as soon as the FDA approves its application. 42 The patent holder is notified and provided a window of opportunity to initiate litigation in the federal courts to block market entry. If the patent holder initiates litigation, there is an automatic stay (30 months) of the effectiveness of any registration until the court has made a determination about the validity of the patent (which may be sooner than 30 months). 43 This system includes an element designed to encourage generic producers to seek early entry of their products onto the market (including by challenging the validity of patents). The first party that successfully applies for approval of a generic version of an originator product is granted a 180-day period of generic marketing exclusivity.
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In 2002, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission issued a report concluding that the FDA Orange Book system was subject to a substantial amount of abuse by patent holders. 45 Among other problems, originators were found to have filed highly suspect patent applications in order to prevent the marketing of generic drugs. In addition, the system permitted more than one patent holder challenge to the ANDA, leading to a succession of automatic 30 months stays. As a consequence of this report, the rules of the FDA were amended, inter alia, to prevent successive stays, 46 and a consent decree was imposed on a major pharmaceutical company to prevent further abuses of the Orange Book list. 47 The FTAs generally require parties to implement measures in their pharmaceutical marketing approval process to prevent the approval of generic products from becoming effective during the term of a patent, without the consent or acquiescence of the patent holder. The FTA provision refers to the adoption of "measures in its marketing approval process to prevent … other persons from marketing a product covered by a patent during the term of that patent". This obligation is stated in a way that does not appear to contemplate a system which requires the patent holder to affirmatively intervene to prevent effective marketing approval. Yet, since the U.S. marketing approval system requires affirmative patent holder intervention this must be contemplated as a permitted method for implementing the obligation, and this mechanism of patent holder intervention is contemplated by subparagraph (b). Even so, for most developing countries the adoption of a system such as that used in the United States will place a considerable strain on the legal and regulatory system. That is, the courts will be faced with lawsuits and demands for injunction initiated by patent holders to prevent market entry. If the patent office does not perform substantive examination of applications, there are likely to be even more "bad patents" listed on a public health regulatory ledger than on the U.S. FDA Orange Book. There is, in fact, a significant likelihood that in order to minimize legal and administrative burdens, public health regulatory authorities in developing countries will accept at face value that patents are valid and block the effective registration and market entry of generic drugs.
There are two main points. First, the language of the FTA permits but does not spell out the conditions and qualifications that are part of the U.S. regulatory system. The U.S. system may not be "in conflict" with the language of the FTA, but unless one is familiar with the way the U.S. system works it would be very difficult to understand the arrangement. Second, it will be very difficult for many developing countries to adopt and/or implement a system modeled on that of the United States because of the legal complexity. A developing country is more likely to adopt a simplified procedure which puts greater power in the hands of the patent holder. This will avoid potential conflicts with U.S. trade enforcement authorities.
Compulsory transfer of trade secret
The U.S.-Australia and U.S.-Singapore FTAs limit the grounds on which compulsory licenses may be granted and incorporate TRIPS-plus conditions. Compulsory licensing may only be authorized to remedy anticompetitive practices or in cases of public noncommercial use, national emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency. With respect to public noncommercial use and national emergency/urgency, three conditions are added. One is that:
"(iii) the Party shall not require the patent owner to transfer undisclosed information or technical 'know how' related to a patented invention that has been authorized for use without the consent of the patent owner pursuant to this paragraph."
The U.S. federal government has broad powers to take private property for public use, 48 subject to the payment of just compensation as provided by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 49 The President may authorize takings by executive order pursuant to his constitutional power as the executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, 50 and the Congress may legislate such takings. 51 While the federal Trade Secrets Act criminalizes unauthorized disclosure by government employees of confidential business data, 52 this does not apply when agency disclosures are made pursuant to law. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) also contains a prohibition against taking personal advantage of or revealing trade secrets, but this would not preclude a government taking order directed to a patent holder, nor would it appear to preclude the FDA's use of information in implementing government use of a patent.
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Although there is no specific federal statute authorizing the President to take undisclosed information or technical know-how from a private party, in a national emergency the President would be constitutionally empowered to take such property. It defies common sense to suggest that if the nation were faced with an imminent threat of serious disease outbreak, and the federal government determined that it was necessary to produce a patented pharmaceutical, that it could not and would not also order and compel the transfer of trade secret information to enable such production.
The disconnect between the U.S. government behavior and legal rhetoric with respect to authorization of government use of pharmaceutical patents and data was illustrated in 2001 when Secretary of Health Thompson threatened to issue a compulsory license on Bayer's Cipro patent, 54 and in 2005 when Secretary of Health Leavitt stated before Congress that the United States could not tolerate a situation in which Tamiflu was not produced within the United States, because in a pandemic situation foreign suppliers could not be relied upon. 55 The comment by Leavitt was inconsistent with the position the United States took against Brazil in initiating a dispute settlement action at the WTO on the basis of Brazil's compulsory licensing statute because, with respect to Roche and Tamiflu, the U.S. government was effectively compelling the foreign patent holder to produce within the United States as a condition of maintaining patent exclusivity. 56 As the United States confronted the potential for an avian flu pandemic, it was made explicit that the government was prepared to take whatever steps it considered necessary and appropriate to protect the U.S. population, and it is inconceivable that these steps would not extend to taking and/or making use of proprietary Roche production process information as the situation warranted.
Parallel importation of patented products
Several of the FTAs obligate the parties to allow patent holders to block parallel imports of patented products. The legal formula allows the parties to condition the right to block such imports on a contract-based restriction. The WTO TRIPS Agreement accounts for the exceptions by incorporation of the articles of the Berne Convention which provide for them (Article 9.1, TRIPS Agreement incorporating Articles 1-21, Berne Convention, including Articles 9-10bis), and by inclusion of a TRIPSspecific exceptions provision (Article 13, TRIPS Agreement).
The FTAs incorporate an exception provision comparable to that of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, extending its explicit application to performances and phonograms. 63 Moreover, because the parties to the FTAs acknowledge the continuing application of the Berne Convention, the exceptions of that Convention are incorporated, notwithstanding the lack of explicit references.
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Because the parties are generally enabled to adopt the exceptions permitted under the TRIPS Agreement and Berne Convention, the FTAs do not prevent developing countries from following the US lead with respect to the breadth of exceptions they choose to adopt. The question is whether developing countries will have the institutional capacity and political will to do this. The FTA, by requiring parties to prevent parallel importation of copyrighted works, have internationally bound the United States to a particular interpretation of the Copyright Act prior to a determination by the Supreme Court regarding the proper interpretation of the Act. It is of interest that in its Quality King decision, the Court held that several executive trade agreements with Caribbean countries (which prohibited parallel trade in copyrighted works) could not influence the Court's interpretation of the Copyright Act.
Parallel importation of copyrighted works
Geographical Indications
Conflicts between trademarks and geographical indications
In the United States, protection for geographical indications is generally accomplished through registration of certification or collective trademarks. Registration as a certification or collective mark is available for all classes of goods. However, the United States maintains an additional system that allows for the protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits. However, the U.S. system for the registration and protection of the name of viticultural areas which are used as identifiers for wines does not require that applications for registration be rejected if a name is confusingly similar to a registered trademark. In Sociedad Anonima 
Enforcement
Publication of written judicial opinions
A discrepancy between U.S. law and practice and the terms of the FTAs lies in the area of the publication requirement. Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement also includes a publication requirement that is applicable to "final judicial decisions pertaining to the subject matter of the agreement". The FTA provision adds the requirement that the decisions be in writing and state relevant findings of fact and the reasoning or legal basis of the decision.
The federal judiciary of the United States makes a routine practice of not publishing opinions. 67 The vast majority of federal appellate court decisions are unpublished. 68 While a substantial number of unpublished opinions are available on the Internet, not all such opinions are available. Moreover, the opinions are not consolidated on readily searchable web sites. 69 The U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit federal district court judges to orally announce their judgments in open court. 70 There is no requirement that the parties or public be provided with a written opinion setting forth reasoning. State courts follow similar rules and practices. 71 As a matter of policy, it may be laudable for the United States to encourage the writing and publication of reasoned opinions by foreign judiciaries. However, since this is neither the uniform law nor the practice of U.S. courts, it is imposing an obligation on foreign legal systems which it does not itself accept and which may involve a significant financial and administrative burden, particularly for developing countries.
The rules and practice of the U.S. federal judiciary may be inconsistent with Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. That inconsistency is exacerbated by the terms of the FTA which expand on the TRIPS Agreement obligation.
Damages calculation
The provisions of the FTAs regarding calculation of damages for infringement of IPRs set forth a methodology. For example, Article 15.11 of the U.S. Morocco FTA provides: The standard of "suggested retail price" is used in only one of the many U.S. statutes regulating intellectual property, that is, the prohibition in the Tariff Act of 1930 against the importation of goods bearing an infringing trademark. 72 U.S. courts generally have substantial discretion in determining the basis for establishing the level of damages in cases of infringement. In a trademark infringement suit, the trademark holder is ordinarily required to prove its "actual damages" which would be based on the market price of its goods. The "suggested retail price" of a good or service will be the "market price" in only a limited number of cases. The Copyright Act also uses the measure of "actual damages", providing: A U.S. court might allow a trademark, copyright or patent holder to base its claim for remedies in an infringement action on the suggested retail price of its goods if there was no reasonable way to prove the actual selling price of the goods in the market. However, because the suggested retail price is a hypothetical price this would not be a first option.
The use of "suggested retail price" as the basis for calculating damages is also problematic because it suggests that the IPRs holder receives the "retail" price for its goods or services. In many cases, the IPRs holder will sell to intermediaries such as wholesalers and distributors and will receive a price substantially discounted from the suggested retail price, even assuming that the suggested retail price represents the price paid by the consuming public. The IPRs holder's "actual damages" should instead be based on the price it receives from the intermediaries. The FTA provision does not limit courts solely to the consideration of "suggested retail price" in the calculation of damages. However, it requires the courts to take this measure into account when presented by the right holder. In doing so, it implies that using the basis of "suggested retail price" is a "safe harbor" under the FTA which can be used to avoid trade disputes. The argument has been made that because the TRIPS Agreement permits WTO Members to adopt higher levels of protection than the minimum, and because the Doha Declaration does not literally require Members to take advantage of flexibilities, restrictions in the FTAs do not technically violate the Declaration. 75 In other words, it is argued, nothing in the Doha Declaration prevents a government from abandoning the Declaration's confirmation of sovereign rights.
It is difficult, however, to reconcile this argument with the essential object and purpose of the Declaration which "reaffirm[s] the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose" (Paragraph 4). 76 That object and purpose, as reflected in the terms of the Declaration, is to assure that the TRIPS Agreement is "interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."
The bilateral and regional agreements negotiated with developing countries restrict or eliminate TRIPS Agreement flexibilities
As noted at the outset of this paper, Congress has identified objectives with respect to negotiations on intellectual property in international trade agreements. These include "ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law" and "to respect the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health".
The FTAs largely reflect U.S. IPRs standards.
In that regard, it might be said that the IPRs rules in the FTAs reflect standards "similar" to those of the United States. However, in some cases, such as the regulatory review exception, the FTA standard appears more protective of IPR holder interests than current U.S. law. In some others, such as the rule on parallel trade in copyrighted works, the FTAs pre-judge a determination yet to be made by the Supreme Court. In still others, such as restricting the use of confidential data in national emergencies, the FTAs impose obligations which would never as a practical matter be enforced within the United States. At the very least, from a public health standpoint, a rule depriving the U.S. government of the ability to effectively address a national public-health emergency is a terrible idea.
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was adopted to address specific developing country concerns that the TRIPS Agreement was being used by certain developed countries and their industry groups to prevent important reforms of health-care legislation and to restrict access to medicines. 74 In particular, the Doha Declaration was a response to actions by the United States and European Union threatening South Africa with trade sanctions for legislation implementing its 1996 public health policy, coupled with a lawsuit by 39 pharmaceutical companies. The WTO dispute settlement action against Brazil based on its compulsory licensing legislation provided further impetus for the Declaration. 
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The Hatch-Waxman Act, which is the legislative basis for the system under which generic medicines are authorized for marketing by the U.S. FDA (discussed infra), illustrates the balance between protecting the rights of patent holders and promoting the introduction of competitive non-patented generic medicines onto the market. 9 Theoretically, the FTAs could spell out in greater detail exceptions to general rules, effectively mandating an equivalency among intellectual property systems. However, the creation of a more elaborate system of exceptions would be contrary to the preservation of flexibility in the establishment of intellectual property policy. Reflecting the object and purpose of the Doha Declaration, the objective of developing countries should be to preserve regulatory flexibility, not restrict it. This statutory provision is directed to information obtained by the FDA under its statutory authority and would not apply to information otherwise acquired by the federal government from a patent holder. To the extent the federal government intended to use information already in the possession of the FDA, the provision expressly refers to "us[e] by any person to his own advantage or revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department". This language does not appear to encompass federal government use of data for its own manufacturing and supply requirements because such use would not involve personal gain, and the provision does not appear to preclude employees of the FDA from making use of data for public purposes. That's one of the reasons we have pushed so hard for Roche to develop domestic manufacturing capacity, which they have agreed to do and are in the process of developing.
LEAVITT: I don't believe that will be an issue in a pandemic, because I think people who have it within their borders will keep it.
ALLEN: That may well be if it's global and not concentrated in one country or another.
Back when we had the anthrax scare here and Cipro was the available drug to treat it, Secretary Thompson said --essentially threatened the compulsory licensing. Would you be prepared to do the same?
And now I grant you --what you said before --I grant you the manufacturing process is long and difficult and complicated, but would you be prepared to issue a compulsory license if Roche failed to provide an adequate authority to expand production here?
LEAVITT: I do not contemplate that being a circumstance that would present itself. It is important, however, that people of this country know we will do everything necessary to protect them." 
